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THE U.S. NAVY WON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
n 1914, the European empires muddled into a world war of unprecedented scale, 
which destroyed the global economic and diplomatic system. Initially remem-
bered as the “Great War,” the First World War would influence concepts of strat-
egy and professional education within the U.S. Navy.1 While the United States 
remained neutral, the war dominated strategic discussions at the Naval War Col-
lege in Newport, Rhode Island. U.S. naval professionals monitored the conflict 
from afar, using the innovative “chart maneuver” methods of Captain William 
McCarty Little and information from all available sources to reconstruct battles.2 
Following the earlier battles of the Falkland Islands and Dogger Bank, the epic 
battle of Jutland of 31 May and 1 June 1916 particularly sparked major debate 
within the ranks of the U.S. Navy about the future of naval warfare. This article is 
the first to analyze the USN studies of the battle of Jutland that were conducted 
within weeks of the actual battle in 1916.
Battleships remained the predominant focus within the Navy Department, but 
Captain William S. Sims advocated for the continued development of a “balanced” 
American fleet.3 He believed the U.S. Navy also required lighter armored battle 
cruiser designs that offered firepower similar to that of battleships, combined 
with speed and endurance.4 Yet the British battle cruisers had suffered withering 
losses at Jutland. The poor performance of British battle cruisers prompted Navy 
Secretary Josephus Daniels to consider cancelling further American investment 
in battle cruisers. Sims strongly disagreed, warning Daniels to avoid drawing false 
conclusions from newspaper accounts about Jutland. Sims acknowledged having 
“read carefully the American press accounts of the action,” but claimed special 
insight gained from a “considerable number of clippings received from England 
which give a much fuller account.”5
I
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Sims applied Naval War College methods of analysis 
to reconstruct the battle of Jutland in detail. He then 
offered a strikingly accurate assessment of the strate-
gic consequences of Jutland in an 8 July 1916 report to 
Daniels. Sims also enjoyed unique access to information 
provided by his longtime friend Royal Navy admiral Sir 
John Jellicoe—the commander of the Grand Fleet during 
the battle of Jutland. Shortly after the battle, in June 1916, 
Jellicoe sent a packet to Sims that included an advance 
copy of his official report, appended to another study of 
the battle by British journalist Arthur Pollen. Few outside 
the Admiralty had access to such information at the time.
These documents enabled Sims to begin framing the 
basic chronology of the battle of Jutland.6 Of special note, 
Sims filed other reports in a paper folder marked in his 
hand as “Admiral Jellicoe’s Report of the Battle of Jutland Bank.”7 The body of 
information Sims compiled in the summer of 1916 demonstrates the importance 
U.S. naval professionals placed on the battle at the time. However, after the pub-
lication in 1942 of the only comprehensive biography of Sims, Admiral Sims and 
the Modern American Navy by Elting Morison, these particular records fell into 
general obscurity within the historiography.8
Yet it was over the course of this half a year—from the time of the battle of Jut-
land to the end of 1916—that domestic and external events and the efforts of Sims 
(and others) combined to set precedents for naval officer education, historical 
and strategic study, USN fleet organization, and concepts of combined and joint 
command that informed American naval strategic thinking through the Second 
World War and into the Cold War era. A century ago, Sims and his associates set 
the course that led to the U.S. Navy of the twenty-first century.
THE JELLICOE CONNECTION
A century after the battle of Jutland and other battles of the First World War, 
contemporary naval professionals may gain fresh insight on questions of strategy 
and command by revisiting pertinent original documentary sources.
There have been recent studies of Jutland, many centering on Jellicoe’s decision 
making. The admiral’s grandson Nicholas offered a provocative analysis by ad-
dressing popular myths surrounding the battle in Jutland: The Unfinished Battle; 
A Personal History of a Naval Controversy. James Goldrick provided important 
context to the battle in his study Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern Eu-
ropean Waters, August 1914–February 1915. In another analysis, The Rules of the 
Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, Andrew Gordon suggested that the 
Captain William S. Sims, USN. Circa 1910. 
Naval War College Collection
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bureaucratic culture of the Royal Navy contributed to strategic mistakes during 
the battle. The edited publication of the original British naval staff appreciation, 
as compiled by William Schleihauf and Stephen McLaughlin, highlighted the 
bitter debates within the Admiralty, as many questioned decisions Jellicoe made 
during the battle of Jutland.9
However, among such published histories of the battle, few researchers ex-
amined the obscure role of the U.S. Navy in efforts to understand what actually 
happened at Jutland. The key to unlocking this major gap in the historical record 
may be found within the close correspondence between Jellicoe and Sims. Their 
collaboration began in China after the Boxer Rebellion in the early 1900s and 
continued to flourish thereafter. Jellicoe’s exploits in China, as reported by news-
papers throughout the British Empire, had earned him international renown as 
a naval hero. He was presented as a figure reminiscent of Horatio, Lord Nelson, 
even as the Royal Navy prepared to mark the centennial, in 1905, of the battle of 
Trafalgar; the first sea lord, Sir John “Jackie” Fisher, explicitly referred to Jellicoe 
as the “future Nelson.”10 Jellicoe carried the millstone of Nelson for the remainder 
of his career, suffering the burdens of unanticipated popularity.11
Jellicoe’s fame on the international naval stage greatly impressed Sims, while 
Jellicoe recognized Sims as a unique figure in the U.S. Navy. (They also shared 
similar interests in the technical field of naval gunnery.) As Sims earned fame 
within the ranks for fighting the bureaucracy of the Navy Department, Jellicoe 
initiated correspondence with him. Sims demonstrated acute political sense, 
gaining access to the highest levels of American command as the naval aide to 
President Theodore Roosevelt. Through Roosevelt’s good offices, 
Sims secured command of the battleship USS Minnesota (BB 22)—
as a junior commander. This appointment sparked controversy 
within the service, as commanding officers of battleships typically 
were full captains.12 However, Rear Admiral Jellicoe, then third 
sea lord at the Admiralty in London, warmly encouraged Sims. “I 
congratulate you and the United States Navy. . . . I hope if you do 
come over [to Britain] I shall see you.”13
As skipper of an American battleship, Sims then symbolically 
sailed into the limelight of the international media: six years before 
the battle of Jutland, Jellicoe and Sims celebrated an undeclared 
Anglo-American alliance. The Royal Navy hosted the USN battle-
ships of the Atlantic Fleet’s 3rd Battle Squadron for Thanksgiving 
of 1910. As skipper of Minnesota, the flagship, Sims reveled in the 
spirit of Anglo-American collaboration. In early December, Sims 
and his crew attended a series of events at Guildhall in central 
London. Commenting on the traditional maritime connections 
Admiral John Rushworth Jellicoe, RN, 
Grand Fleet commander at Jutland, as 
a captain. Circa 1905. His appearance 
on a cigarette package highlights the 
superstar status he held in the Royal 
Navy—before Jutland. 
Wikipedia, s.v. “John Jellicoe, First Earl 
Jellicoe,” en.wikipedia.org/
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between Britannia and the Americas, Sims was quoted as saying that if the “Brit-
ish Empire is seriously menaced by an external enemy, it is my personal opinion 
that you may count upon every man, every dollar, every drop of blood, of your 
kindred across the sea.”14
The empires of Germany and Japan flooded the American Departments of 
State and the Navy with strongly worded official complaints about the remarks 
Sims had offered in London. President William H. Taft removed Sims from 
command.15
“CHEER UP” AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Sims received orders to the Naval War College for temporary duty in 1911, which 
later resulted in an extended assignment to the College’s “Long Course.” Sims 
hoped the Naval War College appointment would end up being a mere waypoint, 
writing that maybe “things will blow over to such an extent that I may get some 
duty that I would like better than the War College—something in closer touch 
with practice and less on the theoretical side.”16
Sims regarded the assignment as a complete setback, far from the sort of duty 
that would lead to higher command within the ranks of the U.S. Navy. Given the 
seagoing priorities of the service, the College remained modestly equipped, un-
derstaffed, and inadequately funded. Since its establishment in 1884, the College 
had struggled to survive as a unique venue for professional naval education. War 
games conducted on the third floor of Luce Hall inspired U.S. naval profession-
als to gain fresh perspectives by examining historical events, using methods of 
decision analysis to develop naval tactics and to consider transcendent strategic 
factors applicable to planning future operations. Following the controversy sur-
rounding the Guildhall remarks, many supporters encouraged Sims to treat as-
signment to the College as an opportunity to “tone down his ideas.”17 Typically, 
Sims instead pursued a radical course, refining his radical views about the future 
strategic role of the Naval War College in relation to the operational forces of the 
U.S. Navy.
Sims used the Naval War College to open a fresh front in his campaign against 
USN bureaucracy. During his studies, he produced a series of provocative essays 
for publication in the Naval Institute Proceedings about the importance of educa-
tion, doctrine, and strategic studies of history.18 Sims treated the assignment to 
study at the College as an opportunity to work with the institution’s founders, 
retired rear admirals Stephen B. Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Other officers 
affiliated with Sims at the College included Commander William V. Pratt, Lieu-
tenant Commanders Dudley W. Knox and Arthur MacArthur III (Douglas’s 
brother), Lieutenants William S. Pye and Royal E. Ingersoll, and Marine captains 
Earl “Pete” Ellis and Frederick Delano (the cousin of Franklin Delano Roosevelt). 
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Personal associations established during their studies at the Naval War College 
fueled a competitive spirit among graduates to read, write, and fight for the vision 
of a U.S. Navy “second to none.”19
On graduation, Sims secured command of the then-named Atlantic Fleet 
Destroyer and Torpedo Boat Flotilla. In this role, he assembled a unique team of 
younger officers to apply the Naval War College approach to examining questions 
of strategy and tactics for practical application to operations at sea. Sims referred 
to his flotilla skippers as a Nelsonian “band of brothers.”20 He recruited Pratt to 
serve as his chief of staff and Knox as aide. With Sims establishing temporary 
headquarters in the flagship USS Dixie (AD 1), at anchor off Newport, Lieuten-
ant Commander John V. Babcock served as the staff operations officer. Destroyer 
skippers serving under Sims in the flotilla developed lasting ties that later proved 
crucial in wartime, including Lieutenant Commanders Ernest J. King, Harold R. 
Stark, Harry E. Yarnell, and William F. Halsey Jr.21
Working for Sims could be draining. Sims relied heavily on the advice of his 
staff in organizing the flotilla into a cohesive team. He decided to shift from Dixie 
to the cruiser USS Birmingham (CL 2), and leaned on Pratt, Knox, and Babcock 
to oversee the work involved with refitting Birmingham. This took its toll on 
Knox; he developed ulcers, then collapsed under the stress. However, even after 
King took his place, Knox continued acting as an adviser to Sims throughout an 
extended medical convalescent leave ashore.22 It was at Knox’s recommendation 
that Sims in the summer of 1914 recruited King to serve as aide. Sims and Pratt 
arranged early detachment orders for King as skipper in USS Terry (DD 25) dur-
ing operations off Veracruz.23 Surprised by his reassignment, King was perplexed 
to receive orders for duty as skipper in USS Cassin (DD 43);24 at the time, Cassin 
was sitting in dry dock at the Boston Naval Shipyard, undergoing an extended 
refit.25
In a wireless message, Sims advised King to recognize the orders to Cassin as 
an opportunity to build a reputation within the ranks. Then, shortly after King 
took command of Cassin in Boston, he received additional orders to report to the 
flagship Birmingham for duty immediately under Sims on the destroyer flotilla 
staff. King wished to avoid staff duty and preferred to remain in command of 
Cassin, although he sent a deferential letter stating that “I am ready to come to 
the Birmingham if, in your opinion, I ought to come.”26 Sims recognized King 
as an officer with great potential, and left King to make the choice on whether 
to remain in command of Cassin. “I can quite understand your desire to get 
some experience in command [and will] try and get a man to take Knox’s place.” 
However, Sims pointedly told King that, as “the efficiency of the whole flotilla of 
course comes ahead of that of any one boat or individual, I may have to ask you 
to help us out.”27 Thus, while Sims allowed King to make the decision whether to 
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remain in Cassin, he at the same time appealed to King’s sense of teamwork by 
referring to the broader mission of the flotilla.
“Captain Sims himself was an officer of extraordinary energy,” King recalled; 
Sims exhibited decisiveness as a commander in that “all matters were clear white 
or dead black.”28 King remained skipper in Cassin and simultaneously accepted the 
additional duty under Sims on the flotilla staff. On a daily basis, King traveled be-
tween Boston and Newport, balancing his responsibilities to both the Cassin crew 
and the flotilla staff.29 Reflecting on this experience, King maintained that he was 
“never one of the group of Sims’s devoted disciples and followers.”30 Nevertheless, 
Sims remained a mentor to King as the latter ascended the ranks to higher com-
mand, and later in his career King would employ an approach similar to Sims’s 
in organizing fleets and meeting the higher responsibilities of naval command.31
Because destroyers largely were relegated to secondary status compared with 
the battleships and battle cruisers of the Atlantic Fleet, Sims and the destroyer 
flotilla often operated with significant independence. Sims organized tabletop 
war games, chaired professional discussions, and engaged in debates about eso-
teric points of maritime history.32 Through these discussions, Sims and his staff 
developed totally new tactics for maneuvering destroyers in unison. In the waters 
of Narragansett Bay, under the very shadow of the Naval War College, Sims used 
the smaller destroyers to test theories. He maneuvered his warships in simulated 
combat exercises off Newport, employing wireless instead of the traditional 
semaphore and light signals, using a communications system of no more than 
thirty-one words. Sims and his destroyers successfully demonstrated the “War 
College afloat” concept.33
All this activity provided much entertainment to the many skeptical observers 
among the larger line-of-battle warships of the Atlantic Fleet. But Sims, with his 
destroyer skippers, was pioneering new tactics that had potential for application 
to larger fleet operations, while saving considerable expense by using destroy-
ers instead of battleships. Together, Sims and the destroyer flotilla completely 
rewrote existing U.S. naval doctrine and tactical procedures.
One of the innovative tactics was the “ripple maneuver.”34 Using a single 
wireless signal, Sims and his destroyers executed simultaneous turns in unison. 
Traditionally, fleet commanders had run the risk of collision while maneuvering 
a number of warships together in combat. While Sims’s methodology seemed ba-
sic, conducting such maneuvers with wireless and in the absence of visual signals 
proved revolutionary.35
German naval strategists apparently noted the success of Sims and the now-
named Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla. During the battle of Jutland, the German 
fleet executed the very difficult maneuver of turning simultaneously away from 
the British Grand Fleet. After the war, Sims invited some of the German skippers 
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to deliver lectures for the educational benefit of the U.S. Navy. In one lecture on 
Jutland, German rear admiral Paul Behnke told Naval War College students that 
the German High Seas Fleet commander, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, executed 
the “ripple manoevre” as perfected by Sims and the Atlantic Fleet destroyers.36 
Although Behnke may have been attempting to ingratiate himself with former 
American enemies, Sims, the War College afloat concept, and the tactics de-
veloped by the Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla clearly resonated among naval 
thinkers on the international stage.
Despite the educational benefits the Naval War College offered, Navy Secre-
tary Daniels questioned the cost of maintaining it. Notwithstanding the particular 
Newport focus on maritime aspects, the strategy and doctrine covered appeared 
comparable to that studied at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 
In discussions with the newly appointed Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Ad-
miral William S. Benson, Daniels proposed organizing a unified army and navy 
war college, which could be established in closer proximity to the capital. As the 
first to hold office as CNO, Benson recognized the politics inherent in the idea. 
Given Daniels’s point of view, Benson gave serious consideration to the idea of a 
joint war college.37
However, it seemed outrageous to Sims to consider closing the Naval War 
College while the U.S. Navy was navigating the difficult waters of neutrality. He 
considered the College’s location an advantage, because he valued the intellectual 
Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla in action in Narragansett Bay in 1914. 
U.S. Navy Photograph (NH 93694)
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objectivity enhanced by the distance between the political arenas of Washington 
and the classroom battlefields of the war colleges. In this discussion, Sims regard-
ed the mission of the Naval War College as strategic in nature, and he defended 
the separateness of America’s war colleges on the basis of the differences between 
the land and sea services. Sims viewed the Naval War College as foundational for 
shaping the future of the U.S. Navy.38 On behalf of the College, he fought against 
the entrenched bureaucracy of the Navy Department. “The Naval War College 
should be made one of the principal assets of the Naval Service,” he opined. If cost 
savings were necessary, he argued that the service should place warships “out of 
commission in order to avoid decreasing the efficiency of the education of our 
officers.”39
Sims alternately scolded fellow U.S. naval professionals and sought to enlist 
their support in the fight. He challenged them to seek perspective from his-
tory, arguing that they should recognize the fundamental role historical studies 
played in framing contemporary plans for the future. Sims published an article 
in Proceedings under the provocative title “Cheer Up!! There Is No Naval War 
College.” The piece offered a counterfactual argument that allowed him to make 
“plain that he [was] a thorough and enthusiastic advocate of the college, and that 
he deplore[d] the failure of many officers to understand its vital importance to 
the efficient conduct of our fleet.” “When I went to the college,” Sims exclaimed, 
“the service was very generally ignorant of its purposes and the great practical 
value of its teachings.” Sims chastised critics of the Naval War College, suggest-
ing that they suffered from “wholly unpardonable ignorance”; he railed against 
complaints from within the seagoing ranks that many needed a “dictionary to tell 
them the meaning of the commonest terms.” Sims and his associates believed that 
the U.S. Navy suffered under officers of the highest rank who were “‘educated’ 
only in preparation for the lowest commissioned grade.” 40
NEUTRALITY AND WAR
In this fight to maintain the Naval War College, the European conflict amplified 
Sims’s assertions. War among the European empires inevitably spread beyond the 
poisoned trenches of the western front, immediately affecting affairs within the 
American sphere of influence. British, French, and Dutch targets attracted Ger-
man warships into American waters.41 The reverse occurred as well; for example, 
the German auxiliary cruisers SMS Kronprinz Wilhelm and Prinz Eitel Friedrich 
drew Royal Navy and French warships into American waters. Under the interna-
tional laws of the time, President Woodrow Wilson allowed these German com-
merce raiders to seek sanctuary in American ports, but British and French war-
ships maintained a steady presence off the U.S. coast in case the German vessels 
attempted to escape their internment.42 British and German warships also battled 
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off the Falkland Islands—which brought warfare into the Western Hemisphere, 
albeit far away. Clearly, these actions challenged the assertions of the Monroe 
Doctrine of 1823 and the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904.
As the European navies fought for control on the high seas, the U.S. Navy 
conducted separate operations against Mexican insurgents in the Veracruz cam-
paign.43 American forces in the Asiatic theater also stood watch as Japanese forces 
seized German-claimed territories in China and the Pacific. With the First World 
War thus raging in both Europe and Asia, the distracted Wilson administration 
struggled to keep foreign wars from spreading farther into the Americas. Both 
Germany’s commerce-raiding operations at sea and its clandestine terrorist at-
tacks in New York further amplified tensions: the 1915 sinking of RMS Lusitania 
off the Irish coast by a German submarine coincided with a terrorist campaign 
by German navy captain Franz von Rintelen inside the United States. Rintelen’s 
activities inspired German saboteurs to bomb USN facilities on Black Tom Island 
off the New Jersey coast in July 1916. The resulting explosion damaged the Statue 
of Liberty and scarred the New York City skyline.44
Headlines about the Black Tom explosion and those about the battle of Jutland 
appeared contemporaneously. Having recently won reelection on a platform of 
neutrality, President Wilson directed Navy Secretary Daniels to examine the na-
val options against imperial Germany. By 1916, Wilson and Daniels had largely 
accepted the ideas of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
embracing the notion of employing the U.S. Navy as a buffer against foreign 
naval operations in American waters. To these ends, Congress passed the Naval 
Expansion Acts of 1915 and 1916, which advocated an American navy “second 
to none.”45 As the U.S. Navy stood fast in anticipation of war with Germany, the 
battle of Jutland seemed very close in the minds of many Americans.
JELLICOE, SIMS, AND THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
Jellicoe, as commander of the Royal Navy Grand Fleet at Jutland, had faced a 
difficult decision: to seek a smashing victory akin to Trafalgar, or to ensure the 
preservation of the Grand Fleet so as to maintain the ability to fix the imperial 
German High Seas Fleet in place. During the action in the North Sea approaches 
to the Skagerrak, British battle cruisers under Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty had 
charged ahead of the Grand Fleet, into the teeth of the battleships of the High 
Seas Fleet—and sustained heavy losses. Heroic accounts of the British battle 
cruiser action at Jutland made it appear comparable to the charge of the light 
brigade at Balaclava or the dramatic last stand at the Little Bighorn—at Jutland, 
battle cruisers seemed to have been completely inadequate compared with battle-
ships. Within minutes of Beatty making contact with the German battle cruisers, 
under Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper, the Germans sank two battle cruisers 
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under Beatty’s immediate command. As the Grand Fleet under Jellicoe closed 
with Beatty and the remaining battle cruisers, and as the Germans maneuvered 
to the sanctuary of port, the latter continued inflicting heavy damage on the for-
mer. While the Germans lost one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, one predread-
nought, and five torpedo boats at Jutland, the British lost three battle cruisers, 
three armored cruisers, and eight destroyers. Within seventy-two hours, an esti-
mated 2,551 Germans and 6,094 British sailors were killed in the battle of Jutland.
The Grand Fleet at Jutland ultimately achieved its actual mission—forcing the 
Germans to withdraw from the battlefield. Jellicoe successfully maintained the 
integrity of the Grand Fleet, ensured Royal Navy superiority in European waters, 
and retained for Britain the strategic advantage at sea. But the German High Seas 
Fleet remained a potent threat after the battle. Critics castigated Jellicoe for be-
ing indecisive, while his subordinate Beatty blamed the Grand Fleet for failing 
to support the battle cruisers at Jutland. British newspapers also highlighted the 
losses the Royal Navy had sustained under Jellicoe, which seriously damaged his 
reputation as a “future Nelson.”46 Facing the media, Jellicoe fueled perceptions of 
a Pyrrhic victory at Jutland. He emphasized the strategic necessity of preserving 
the superiority of the Royal Navy so as to keep the German High Seas Fleet in 
check. Jellicoe also believed that Beatty had acted on his own initiative, charging 
headlong with the Battle Cruiser Fleet into the mist.
Jellicoe was frustrated by the severe price he paid in the popular media for 
failing to deliver a spectacular victory akin to that at Trafalgar. While he grappled 
with that imperfect victory, Jellicoe turned to his old American friend, Sims. 
Additionally, from the British perspective, Jellicoe recognized the importance of 
fostering ties between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy.
On the other side of the Atlantic, reports of the stunning losses of the British 
battle cruisers inspired members of Congress to make official inquiries. Within 
the Navy Department, Secretary Daniels considered the option of cancelling con-
struction of USN battle cruisers because of the British losses at Jutland. Learning 
of these discussions, Sims warned Daniels to avoid making false assumptions 
about the lessons of Jutland.47 As early as 8 July 1916, Sims applied Naval War 
College methods of analysis to construct a detailed study of what actually had 
happened during the battle of Jutland, which he then submitted to Daniels.48 
By refuting Daniels’s assertions about battle cruisers, Sims sparked even greater 
interest within Congress to understand the consequences of Jutland. Congress 
launched an official inquiry to determine whether the U.S. Navy should continue 
constructing battle cruisers. In response, Sims produced two highly detailed re-
ports in July 1916.
First Sims provided an astonishingly accurate account of the battle of Jutland, 
suggesting that “the action in question was in reality a skirmish.”49 He then 
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defended Jellicoe’s actions by placing responsibility for the ambiguous results of 
the encounter squarely on Beatty’s shoulders. In a six-page report, Sims suggested 
that
of course the Germans knew that Admiral Beatty would come after them with his 
battlecruiser squadrons. Doubtless, also, they assumed, from his supposed reputa-
tion for impetuosity and ambition for distinction, that he would attack at once and 
try to head them off at their base. He apparently did so, and the battleships came up 
and pounded him between the two forces, with the inevitable result that he got the 
worst of it until the British battleships [of Jellicoe] came to his support and forced the 
Germans to retreat.50
Evaluating all available evidence, Sims concluded on 31 July 1916 that Jellicoe had 
acted correctly and Beatty had mishandled the battle cruisers at Jutland by ignor-
ing the “fundamental principle that involves bringing against the enemy a greater 
force than he has at [emphasis in original] the point of contact.”51 Sims argued 
that Jellicoe had acted in the better strategic interests of the Royal Navy, whereas 
Beatty had violated the basic rule of using “just plain common sense unrestricted 
by any sentimental fool traditions of the glory type.”52 Sims concluded that “con-
trol of the sea is accomplished when the enemy’s fleet is defeated or ‘contained’; 
and the German fleet has been contained since the beginning of the war, is now 
contained, and doubtless will remain so.”53
Sims strongly cautioned American policy makers against abandoning the 
construction of battle cruisers. “There is nothing,” Sims argued, “in the incidents 
of the [Jutland] fight to justify any argument against the necessity of battlecruis-
ers.”54 According to Sims’s conclusions, Beatty had employed his battle cruisers 
improperly. Sims also rushed to the defense of his friend Jellicoe. By implication, 
Sims argued that Jutland actually resulted in as decisive a British victory as that 
of Trafalgar more than a hundred years earlier.
To prove these points, Sims used war-gaming and chart-maneuver methods 
to produce objectively detailed studies of the battle of Jutland. Fighting the sepa-
rate battle for the future of professional education within the U.S. Navy, he also 
organized a war-game study of Jutland at the Naval War College. This took place 
a short two months after the actual battle, in September 1916.
JUTLAND WITH “TOYS” IN 1916
Jellicoe maintained regular correspondence with Sims, which provided unique 
means for the U.S. Navy to evaluate the broader significance of the battle of Jut-
land. During the summer of 1916, while at sea off the American east coast super-
vising shakedowns as skipper in USS Nevada (BB 36), Sims again employed the 
War College afloat method. Sailing off the Virginia Capes for gunnery exercises 
in August 1916, he organized Jutland war games in Nevada’s wardroom.55 Sims 
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wrote of his observations about Jutland to his protégés Pratt and Knox, now at the 
Navy Department, and encouraged them to gather newspaper accounts, personal 
letters from their foreign contacts, and U.S. naval attaché reports from London, 
Paris, Rome, and Berlin.56
Given the political stakes involved, USN studies of Jutland had significant 
strategic ramifications for the future of American naval policy. Following Sims’s 
lead, the faculty and students at the Naval War College took great interest in the 
battle. Sims pooled his information with that of his Naval Academy classmate 
Captain Albert P. Niblack, who was completing studies at the College. Niblack 
shared the information Sims supplied with Lieutenant Commander Harry E. 
Yarnell and Lieutenant Holloway H. Frost, among others. Using the Sims mate-
rial as a basis, Niblack, Yarnell, and Frost amassed additional information from 
other sources.57 They then conducted a war game to replicate the battle of Jutland 
in September 1916.
As with their Naval War College studies of Civil War battles, U.S. naval pro-
fessionals recognized that the scope and complexity of Jutland offered useful 
foundations for examining transcendent questions of command, the answers 
to which would have application to future operations. The pioneering methods 
of McCarty Little, whose service on the Naval War College faculty began in the 
1880s, inspired Sims and his associates to recognize that “tactics is the servant of 
strategy [and] every tactical problem should have a strategic setting, or at least 
keep in view the master idea which it is intended to subserve [sic]. That is the 
reason why tactics left to develop by itself is like servants without a master.” In 
examining historical battles such as Trafalgar, McCarty Little had emphasized 
the importance of evaluating decisions made in combat by first considering the 
strategic context to gain a holistic understanding of the tactical details.58
Seeking to attain an objective, firsthand understanding of historical wars, Mc-
Carty Little used nautical charts and tiny model ships to replicate situations faced 
on the battlefield. The curious practice of wargaming past battles appeared trite 
to some—at first glance. Similarly to many Naval War College graduates, Ernest 
J. King joked about the practice of using “toys” and “play things” in the serious 
studies involved with decision analysis and war gaming.59
Nonetheless, in the fall of 1916 faculty members and students at the Naval 
War College played out the Jutland scenario with toy ships, chalk, and measuring 
sticks. Drawing on newspaper accounts and naval attaché reports, the Naval War 
College undertook one of the earliest detailed studies of the battle of Jutland. In 
September 1916, Sims and Knox traveled to Newport to assist the students and 
faculty at the College, whose members included their close associates Niblack, 
Yarnell, and Frost. Working together, they adapted one of the historical battles 
already in use within the Naval War College curriculum—they used the rules for 
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the battle of Trafalgar of 1805 to reconstruct the more recent battle of Jutland of 
1916.60
Following the war-game reconstruction of Jutland, Frost took the lead in pro-
ducing an official Naval War College report on 26 November 1916.61 Coincident 
with the strategic study of Jutland at the College, Sims received orders to testify 
about the battle before Congress.
At that time, Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske also told Sims of the latter’s tentative 
selection for promotion to rear admiral. “They could not have done otherwise,” 
Sims understood, “without precipitating a storm that would have wrecked the 
keeping of selection in navy hands.”62 Under restrictions established by congres-
sional appropriations, Sims now stood thirty-first on a roster limited to thirty 
rear admirals; according to the Naval Register, his status was “awaiting commis-
sion” in the rank of captain.63 Given congressional interest in the battle of Jutland, 
Sims recognized that his opportunity to discuss the subject in Congress consti-
tuted a unique opportunity to make a lasting impression and thereby to secure a 
fruitful assignment in the rank of rear admiral in the near future.64
On 19 December 1916, Sims explained to Congress the strategic consequences 
of Jutland. In answering queries about the tactical role of battleships and battle 
cruisers in the context of that particular engagement, Sims more broadly outlined 
Examining the battle of Jutland on the third floor of Luce Hall, Naval War College. Circa 1916. 
Naval War College Collection
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the potential influence of wireless communication, intelligence, submarines, and 
aircraft on naval warfare.65 When discussing the strategic priorities of the U.S. 
Navy, Sims specifically referred to the Naval War College report about the battle. 
“There is a typewritten copy of an analysis made at the Naval War College,” Sims 
explained in testimony, “simply compiled from official and semiofficial published 
reports.”66
GERMANY INTRUDES
Within the same context of his remarks concerning the battle of Jutland, Sims also 
answered congressional queries about recent visits to American ports by Ger-
man submarines. Between July and November 1916, the German submarines U-
Deutschland and U-53 visited the ports of Baltimore, New London, and Newport.
Of particular interest, U-53’s skipper specifically targeted the Naval War Col-
lege for an unannounced visit. On 7 October 1916, Lieutenant Hans Rose sailed 
U-53 into Narragansett Bay and brazenly anchored under the shadow of the Na-
val War College. He appeared on shore in proper dress uniform, wearing white 
starched collar, bowtie, and cap—cocked at an angle. Rose casually walked from 
the Naval War College pier up a hill, knocked on the front door of Luce Hall, 
and introduced himself to the President of the Naval War College, Rear Admiral 
Austin Knight.67
The appearance of a German submarine coincided with the College’s efforts 
to compile the official report on Jutland. Clearly, Knight avoided discussing these 
Lieutenant Thomas Symington, USN, aide to Commander, Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Flotilla, shakes hands with Lieutenant Hans Rose, IGN, on board U-53 
at buoy two at the Naval War College, 7 October 1916. 
U.S. Navy Photograph
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studies in conversations with Rose. Rose later recalled that he “was received in 
the roomy naval station,” but that “[Knight] was not quite sure what he ought to 
do.”68 After the brief meeting in the office of the President, Rose hosted a number 
of USN officers for drinks in U-53. During these conversations, the Germans 
joked about speaking in English (the language of the enemy) by claiming, “I 
speak American.”69
Despite the bonhomie, Rose’s targeting of the Naval War College had dem-
onstrated the capacity of German submarines to reach American waters. When 
U-53 departed for operations in the Atlantic, local Newport yachtsmen trailed 
behind. Rose took station near the Nantucket lightship in the approaches to Nar-
ragansett Bay—just beyond American territorial waters. On 8 October 1916, the 
day after his visit to the College, he sank five vessels, three from Britain and one 
each from Norway and the Netherlands—an implied challenge to the warships of 
the Atlantic Fleet sitting at anchor a mere boat hail from the College.70
Such acts of German aggression fueled tensions within the Wilson adminis-
tration, as did British disclosure of the so-called Zimmermann telegram, which 
revealed a German plot to support Mexican and Japanese attacks on the United 
States, information the British shared with American journalists as early as 
January 1917.71 The cybernetic implications of the Zimmermann telegram would 
coincide with Germany’s reintroduction of unrestricted submarine warfare in 
February 1917. These developments ultimately forced the Wilson administration 
to make strategic preparations for war against imperial Germany.72
Falling as it did chronologically between the Jutland war game and Frost’s 
report on the Naval War College’s analysis of the battle of Jutland, U-53’s visit 
to the College brought home more forcefully the importance of thinking deeply 
and carefully ahead of time about what might be involved in fighting the Ger-
man navy. As the U.S. Navy anticipated war with Germany, the battle of Jutland 
remained the focus of heated discussion regarding the prospective focus of 
American strategy in the spring of 1917.
NO EQUAL IN HISTORY
Early USN studies of Jutland focused on Jellicoe’s operational decisions by exam-
ining the battle through the separate lenses of strategy and tactics. Among other 
major tactical findings, Frost concluded that “Jellicoe was well served by his divi-
sion commanders [who] brought the battle line in order despite his confusing 
and conflicting signals.”73 Frost found that “Beatty committed numerous errors 
. . . and did not show tactical skill [whereas] Jellicoe executed a poor concep-
tion of war excellently.” 74 Drawing debatable analogies, Frost found Jellicoe 
most closely comparable to Union Army general George B. McClellan from the 
American Civil War. This critique perhaps reflected a predetermined conclusion 
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on Frost’s part; previous studies of Civil War battles may have tainted Frost’s 
objectivity in examining Jellicoe’s decisions. Sims, taking a different approach, 
recognized that Jellicoe had made all the correct strategic decisions by focusing 
on the ultimate objective: containing the High Seas Fleet.75
Having examined British and German naval operations at Jutland in detail, 
Sims drew a variety of conclusions for future application within the U.S. Navy. 
He refuted critics of Jellicoe by suggesting that “there is no reason to believe that 
the Germans have ever intended to risk their fleet in a decisive action against a 
greatly superior British fleet[;] . . . they accomplished what they intended, namely, 
the trapping and pounding of the British battle cruisers.” Sims then hastened 
to press the point that “to the surprise of Naval critics, and doubtless to the 
Germans, was the extraordinary resistance battle cruisers can sustain and the 
extraordinary amount of damage they can inflict, even against battleships which 
indicates a greatly enhanced value when they are employed in their proper role 
in a general naval engagement.”76
Seizing on Sims’s assertions, Assistant Navy Secretary Roosevelt fostered a 
political alliance with Virginia senator Claude A. Swanson. Together, Roosevelt 
and Swanson circumvented Daniels in their effort to continue the construction 
of battle cruisers for the U.S. Navy.77 In the winter of 1916, Roosevelt used Sims 
and the findings of the Naval War College war-game report on Jutland to frame 
future American naval policy.
Following his testimony on Jutland in Congress, Sims received orders to the 
Naval War College. In February 1917 he assumed duty as the President of the Col-
lege. Sims then received secret orders to sail for London with verbal authorization 
to assume rank as a rear admiral on 21 March.78 Concurrently, Navy Secretary 
Daniels and CNO Benson directed Sims to act as the Navy Department liaison 
to the Admiralty in London.79 The United States declared war on Germany while 
Sims was at sea in April. Shortly after their first meetings in London, Sims and 
Jellicoe built on their personal friendship to facilitate the broader collaborative 
relationship between the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy.80 
By the manner in which the Admiralty headquarters synthesized operations 
at sea with intelligence, Jellicoe enabled Sims to assume a more strategic role in 
framing combined strategy and in conducting U.S. naval operations at the front. 
As Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe after April 1917, Sims pioneered 
new American concepts of combined and joint command. He also set a new 
precedent when he assumed temporary command over Royal Navy forces with 
the arrival of USN destroyers in Queenstown (Cobh), Ireland.81 Having thus 
pioneered new concepts of combined and joint naval command, Sims returned 
from wartime service for duty as President, Naval War College in April 1919.82
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Sims overhauled the Naval War College curriculum by recruiting veterans 
of the London headquarters to the faculty. Among them, Sims appointed Knox 
to serve as chief of staff. Knox also reorganized the Department of Command, 
within which he organized the Historical Section, under Lieutenant Tracy Bar-
rett Kittredge, U.S. Naval Volunteer Reserve. During their watch, the Naval War 
College archives served as the repository for the USN records of the First World 
War. Sims also approved the titles that Knox and Kittredge selected to expand the 
library from fewer than 7,000 to more than 45,000 volumes.83 Carl von Clause-
witz and Henri de Jomini remained required reading, along with Colmar von 
der Goltz and other Franco-German military thinkers. Looking outward from 
the lectures of Stephen B. Luce and the quasi-historical studies of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, Sims expanded the reading curriculum to include the works of foreign 
naval strategic thinkers, including Sir John Knox Laughton, Spenser Wilkinson, 
and Sir Julian Corbett.84
Along with other faculty in the Sims era, Knox helped expand the role of 
historical studies in framing critical discussions of contemporary doctrinal 
Rear Admiral Sims, standing at center, pioneered new concepts of U.S. naval organization in wartime as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe and 
as senior naval representative of the American Expeditionary Force on the Supreme Allied Naval Council between 1917 and 1919. 
U.S. Navy Photograph (NH 52790)
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assumptions about future wars. While maintaining the traditional focus on bat-
tles such as Trafalgar and the American Civil War studies of the Union blockad-
ing strategy, Sims and Knox placed the battle of Jutland at the center of the basic 
curriculum on strategy and tactics after 1919.85 Through the 1920s and ’30s, stu-
dents attending the Naval War College examined Jutland in ever-greater detail. 
The influence of Jutland on the U.S. Navy appeared within the studies completed 
by Naval War College students in the generation of William D. Leahy, Ernest J. 
King, Harold R. Stark, Chester W. Nimitz, and William F. Halsey Jr.
By intermixing strategic discussions of history with decision analysis recon-
structions of past battles, the U.S. Navy arguably “won” the battle of Jutland in 
the classrooms and on the war-gaming floors of the Naval War College. Because 
of Jellicoe and Sims, the battle of Jutland influenced the perspectives of countless 
U.S. naval officers. For example, Commander Chester W. Nimitz mused in his 
Naval War College “Thesis on Tactics” that the battle of Jutland had “no equal in 
history [and that] it is doubtful if the total forces engaged in the battle of Jutland 
will be exceeded[,] at any rate during our time.”86 Nimitz recalled studying the 
battle in such detail that he knew every commander intimately and every deci-
sion they made “by heart.”87 Twenty years later, Nimitz commanded battles that 
far exceeded in scope the battle of Jutland, such as at Coral Sea, Midway, and 
Leyte Gulf. Arguably, education at the Naval War College provided the critical 
foundations that enabled him and his contemporaries to secure decisive victory 
in the Second World War.
THE CENTENNIAL
Through such deep and careful study, the U.S. Navy won the battle of Jutland in 
the classrooms and on the war-gaming floors of the Naval War College after the 
First World War. To highlight this rich history and to mark the centennial of Jut-
land, the Naval War College replicated the war game that Sims and his associates 
conducted in the battle’s immediate aftermath. In May 2016, the College revisited 
the battle on the historic war-gaming floors of Pringle Hall. Jellicoe’s grandson 
Nick provided a video with a narrative animation of the epic battle, while Sims’s 
grandson, Nat, observed the battle’s replication. Among other participants in the 
Jutland war game, Rear Admiral Sam Cox, USN (Ret.), the director of naval his-
tory, filled the role of Jellicoe, while the President of the Naval War College, Rear 
Admiral P. Gardner Howe III, USN, assumed the role of the German High Seas 
Fleet commander, Admiral Reinhard Scheer.
The Jutland war game of 2016 allowed faculty and student participants to gain 
fresh insight not only into the original battle of a century ago but also into the 
war game as conducted at the Naval War College later in 1916. By emphasizing 
the historical influence of Jutland on the curriculum of the College, the war game 
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evoked how the battle resonated through the history of the U.S. Navy over the 
intervening hundred years. The College intends to stage a series of similar events 
and educational programs between 2017 and 2023 as the U.S. Navy marks the 
centennial of its involvement in the First World War and its aftermath.
During the century since Jutland, the Naval War College has maintained the 
study of history and war-gaming analysis as central components in the profes-
sional education of American strategic thinkers. When Sims attended the long 
course with the class of 1913, he examined the 1805 battle of Trafalgar more than 
a century after the actual battle. Using the same methodology, he applied the War 
College afloat method to reconstruct the battle of Jutland within weeks of the 
actual battle. He helped compile the official report on the Jutland war game and 
decision analysis, published in November 1916. Sims then used this study to in-
form Congress on questions of American naval strategy, just three months before 
the American declaration of war against Germany in April 1917. After the First 
World War, Sims again referred to Jutland in overhauling the College curriculum, 
producing the course of study that educated the strategic minds of the American 
naval professionals who would win decisive victory in the Second World War.
Over the two hundred years since Trafalgar and the one hundred since the 
battle of Jutland, the strategic perspectives gained from studying this rich history 
remain relevant to contemporary strategic thinkers as the U.S. Navy charts a fresh 
course through the twenty-first century and beyond.
Naval War College faculty and students revisiting the battle of Jutland on the historic war-gaming floors of Pringle Hall, May 2016.
Naval War College Collection
6900_Kohnen.indd   141 9/20/16   1:54 PM
19
Kohnen et al.: The U.S. Navy Won the Battle of Jutland
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 4 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
N O T E S
 1. Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern 
Memory (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1975), pp. 310–35.
 2. William McCarty Little, “The Strategic 
War Game or Chart Maneuver,” U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings 38/4/144 (1912), pp. 
1213–33.
 3. William S. Sims, “Comments on North Sea 
Fight,” 31 May 1916, William S. Sims Papers 
[hereafter Sims Papers], correspondence files, 
box 68, Jutland file 1, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC [hereafter LC].
 4. Robert O’Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult 
of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 
9–101, 302–22; Thomas C. Hone and Trent 
Hone, Battle Line: The United States Navy, 
1919–1939 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2006), pp. 2–19, 69–89, 189–95; David 
F. Trask, “William Sowden Sims: The Victory 
Ashore,” in Admirals of the New Steel Navy: 
Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 
1880–1930, ed. James Bradford (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 282–90.
 5. Sims, “Comments on North Sea Fight,” p. 1.
 6. Ibid., pp. 1–6.
 7. Arthur Pollen, “Report on Jutland,” Sims 
Papers, box 68, Jutland file, folder dated 23 
July 1916, LC. This was an advance copy of 
the report.
 8. Elting E. Morison, Admiral Sims and the 
Modern American Navy (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1942), pp. 3–14, 280, 389–92. In May 
2016, Sims’s grandson, Dr. Nathaniel “Nat” 
Sims, donated the original papers Morison 
used in writing this biography to the Naval 
War College. The collection included the 
original manuscript drafts, a comprehensive 
record of duplications and original cor-
respondence by Sims, and all the original 
photographs, sketchbooks, and other related 
ephemera Morison used in writing the biog-
raphy. During the Second World War, and 
thus coincident with the book’s publication 
in 1942, Morison served as a USN reservist 
within the Historical Section of the Office 
of Naval Intelligence under Capt. Dudley 
W. Knox and Professor Robert G. Albion. 
Although Morison remained in close contact 
with his relative Samuel Eliot Morison, the 
various U.S. naval histories written by the two 
should not be perceived as being directly con-
nected or officially coordinated.
 9. Nicholas Jellicoe, Jutland: The Unfinished Bat-
tle; A Personal History of a Naval Controversy 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016); 
James Goldrick, Before Jutland: The Naval 
War in Northern European Waters, August 
1914–February 1915 (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2015); Andrew Gordon, The 
Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval 
Command (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1997); William Schleihauf, ed., with 
Stephen McLaughlin, Jutland: The Naval Staff 
Appreciation (Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 2016).
 10. Arthur J. Marder, Fear God and Dread 
Nought, vol. 2, Years of Power, 1904–1914 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), p. 479.
 11. Goldrick, Jutland, pp. 64–66.
 12. William S. Benson to William S. Sims, March 
1909, Sims Papers, box 48, folder 1909–16, 
LC.
 13. John R. Jellicoe to William S. Sims, 3 
February 1909, Sims Papers, box 68, folder 
1906–18, LC.
 14. Morison, Admiral Sims, p. 281.
 15. “Sims’ Chief Bo’sun for an Alliance Too: 
British Heard from Man before the Mast at 
That Guildhall Love Fest,” New York Times, 
19 December 1910, p. 2; “Taft Drafts Rebuke 
to Sims for Speech; to Be Sent to Commander 
Today after Being Passed on by Cabinet,” New 
York Times, 10 January 1911, p. 2; Morison, 
Admiral Sims, p. 282; Benjamin F. Armstrong, 
ed., 21st Century Sims: Innovation, Education, 
and Leadership for the Modern Era (An-
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), pp. 
135–45; John Dos Passos, Mr. Wilson’s War: 
From the Assassination of McKinley to the 
Defeat of the League of Nations (New York: 
Doubleday, 1962), pp. 231–40.
 16. William S. Sims to Anne Sims, 31 January 
1911, Sims Papers, box 6, LC.
 17. John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson III, 
and John R. Wadleigh, Sailors and Scholars: 
The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War 
College (Newport, RI: Naval War College 
Press, 1984), pp. 76, 289–312.
6900_Kohnen.indd   142 9/20/16   1:54 PM
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 4, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/11
 KO H N E N  1 4 3
 18. William S. Sims, “What Should Be the Rela-
tions between the Battle Fleet and Reserve 
Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 
40/3/151 (May–June 1914), pp. 727–39; Wil-
liam S. Sims, “Naval War College Principles 
and Methods Applied Afloat,” U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings 41/2/156 (March–April 
1915), pp. 383–403; William S. Sims, “Cheer 
Up!! There Is No Naval War College,” U.S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings 42/3/163 (May–
June 1916), pp. 857–58.
 19. David Kohnen, ed., 21st Century Knox: Influ-
ence, Sea Power, and History for the Modern 
Era (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2016), pp. 1–19.
 20. Morison, Admiral Sims, pp. 289–312.
 21. These names and their rotation of assign-
ments may be found in the Naval Registers 
for 1914, 1915, and 1916. Individual personal 
papers also provide critical insight to their 
service with Sims in the Atlantic Fleet De-
stroyer Flotilla.
 22. Dudley W. Knox, personal correspondence 
with William S. Sims, January 1914 through 
March 1915, Sims Papers, box 69, LC.
 23. Dudley W. Knox to William S. Sims, 14 May 
1914, Sims Papers, box 69, LC.
 24. Ernest J. King to William S. Sims, 3 July 1914, 
Sims Papers, box 68, LC.
 25. Ernest J. King, with Walter Muir Whitehill, 
Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1952), pp. 90–92.
 26. King to Sims, 3 July 1914.
 27. Sims to King, 6 July 1914, Sims Papers, box 
68, LC.
 28. Walter Muir Whitehill, miscellaneous notes 
on King’s recollections of fellow naval of-
ficers, 29 August 1949, Ernest J. King Papers 
[hereafter King Papers], box 13, folder 9, Na-
val Historical Collection (Archives), Library 
and Archives, Naval War College [hereafter 
NWC], Newport, RI.
 29. King, Fleet Admiral King, pp. 90–92.
 30. Ibid., p. 91.
 31. Ibid.
 32. Sims, “Naval War College Principles and 
Methods Applied Afloat,” pp. 385–87.
 33. Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, Sailors 
and Scholars, p. 89.
 34. “Flotilla Tentative Doctrine,” 3 March 1914, 
Sims Papers, box 21, Atlantic Fleet Torpedo 
Flotilla, LC.
 35. Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, Sailors 
and Scholars, pp. 88–89.
 36. Morison, Admiral Sims, p. 299.
 37. Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, Sailors 
and Scholars, pp. 115–16, 122.
 38. Armstrong, 21st Century Sims, pp. 1–12, 51, 
75, 154–57; Henry J. Hendrix, USN, Theodore 
Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy 
and the Birth of the American Century (An-
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), pp. 
104–10, 114–17, 123–24; Donald Chisholm, 
Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: Origins and De-
velopment of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Personnel 
System, 1793–1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 514–16.
 39. “History of the Naval War College to 1937” 
(unpublished manuscript), NWC Library, pp. 
97–98.
 40.  Sims, “Cheer Up!!,” pp. 857–59; Dudley W. 
Knox, Ernest J. King, and William S. Pye, 
“Report and Recommendations of a Board 
Appointed by the Bureau of Navigation Re-
garding the Instruction and Training of Line 
Officers,” Bunav. Let. #8039-198, 18 October 
1919, p. 3, Ernest J. King Papers, box 26, LC.
 41. William N. Still Jr., Crisis at Sea: The United 
States Navy in European Waters in World War 
I (Pensacola: Univ. Press of Florida, 2007), 
pp. 25–33; David F. Trask, The AEF and 
Coalition Warmaking, 1917–1918 (Lawrence: 
Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993), pp. 11–12; 
John Milton Cooper Jr., ed., Reconsidering 
Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Interna-
tionalism, War, and Peace (Washington, DC: 
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2008), pp. 15–16, 
226–28. Also see David F. Trask, Captains & 
Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 
1917–1918 (Columbus: Univ. of Missouri, 
1972), pp. 45–68, and Michael Simpson, ed., 
Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1919 
(Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar Press for the Navy 
Records Society, 1991), pp. 60–95.
 42. Richard H. Gibson and Maurice Prendergast, 
The German Submarine War, 1914–1918 
(London: Constable, 1931), pp. 111–40, 
160, 307–14; Paul König, Die Fahrt der 
Deutschland, das erste Untersee-Frachtschiff 
(New York: Hearst International Library, 
6900_Kohnen.indd   143 9/20/16   1:54 PM
21
Kohnen et al.: The U.S. Navy Won the Battle of Jutland
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 4 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
1916), pp. ix–xii, 122–82, 211–54; Alfred von 
Niezychowski, The Cruise of the Kronprinz 
Wilhelm (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
Doran, 1929), pp. vii–xvi, 13–51, 277–300. 
These early histories of the First World War 
at sea provide useful insight to the types 
of histories published during the interwar 
period. In popular American memory, the 
cruises of Kronprinz Wilhelm, Prinz Eitel 
Friedrich, U-Deutschland, and U-53 are often 
overshadowed by events such as the sinking 
of Lusitania.
 43. Jack Sweetman, “Take Veracruz AT ONCE,” 
Naval History 28, no. 2 (April 2014).
 44. Franz Rintelen von Kleist, The Dark Invader: 
Wartime Reminiscences of a German Naval 
Intelligence Officer (London: Lovat Dick-
son, 1933), pp. 79–186; Chad Millman, The 
Detonators: The Secret Plot to Destroy America 
and an Epic Hunt for Justice (New York: Little, 
Brown, 2006), pp. 352–60; Charles C. Marsh, 
Tracy B. Kittredge, and Dudley W. Knox, 
German Submarine Activities on the Atlantic 
Coast of the United States and Canada (Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1920).
 45. Michael D. Besch, A Navy Second to None: 
The History of U.S. Navy Training in World 
War I (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002), pp. 
1–15.
 46. Marder, Years of Power, p. 479.
 47. William S. Sims to Josephus Daniels, 8 July 
1916, Sims Papers, box 68, Jutland file, LC.
 48. Sims, “Comments on North Sea Fight,” pp. 
1–16.
 49. Ibid., p. 5.
 50. Ibid., p. 6.
 51. William S. Sims to John W. Purdy, 31 July 
1916, Sims Papers, box 68, Jutland file, LC.
 52. Ibid.
 53. Sims to Daniels, 8 July 1916, p. 4.
 54. Ibid.
 55. Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, Sailors 
and Scholars, p. 89.
 56. Lt. (j.g.) Holloway H. Frost, comp., “The 
Battle of Jutland,” 26 November 1916, box 72, 
folder 8, Intelligence and Technical Archives 
(RG 8), NWC, available at usnwcarchive 
.org/.
 57. Ibid., pp. 1–2; Sims, “Comments on North 
Sea Fight,” pp. 1–16; Dudley W. Knox to Wil-
liam S. Sims, 27 August 1916, Sims Papers, 
box 69, LC.
 58. McCarty Little, “The Strategic War Game,”  
p. 1231.
 59. Ernest J. King to Jonas Ingram, 20 September 
1941, King Papers, box 7, folder 13, NWC.
 60. Ibid.
 61. Ibid.
 62. Morison, Admiral Sims, p. 333.
 63. U.S. Naval Register, January 1917, p. 8, avail-
able at www.ibiblio.org/.
 64. Dos Passos, Mr. Wilson’s War, pp. 229–40.
 65. William S. Sims, statement before the Com-
mittee on Naval Affairs, House of Representa-
tives, 19 December 1916, pp. 839–77, Sims 
Papers, box 68, Jutland file, LC.
 66. Ibid., p. 860.
 67. Marsh, Kittredge, and Knox, German Subma-
rine Activities, pp. 18–23.
 68. Hans Rose, “With the U-53 to America,” The 
Living Age, 26 November 1926, p. 352.
 69. Marsh, Kittredge, and Knox, German Subma-
rine Activities, p. 22.
 70. Gibson and Prendergast, The German Sub-
marine War, pp. 111–40, 160, 307–14; König, 
Die Fahrt der Deutschland, pp. ix–xii, 122–82, 
211–54; Niezychowski, The Cruise of the  
Kronprinz Wilhelm, pp. vii–xvi, 13–51, 
277–300.
 71. Thomas Boghardt, The Zimmermann 
Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and 
America’s Entry into World War I (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 33–159; 
Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intel-
ligence, 1914–1918 (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, 1982), pp. 1–45; Barbara Tuchman, 
The Zimmermann Telegram: America Enters 
the War, 1917–1918 (New York: Random 
House, 1958), pp. 61–97, 125–40, 168–86; 
Patrick Beesly, “British Naval Intelligence 
in Two World Wars: Some Similarities and 
Differences,” in Intelligence and Interna-
tional Relations, 1900–1945, ed. Christopher 
Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (Exeter, U.K.: 
Univ. of Exeter, 1987), pp. 253–73; David 
Ramsay, “Blinker” Hall: Spymaster—The 
Man Who Brought America into World War I 
6900_Kohnen.indd   144 9/20/16   1:54 PM
22
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 4, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/11
 KO H N E N  1 4 5
(Brimscombe Port, U.K.: History Press, 2010), 
pp. 163–64.
 72. David Kahn, The Code-Breakers: The Com-
prehensive History of Secret Communication 
from Ancient Times to the Internet (New York: 
Scribner’s, 1996), pp. 280–98.
 73. Holloway H. Frost, The Battle of Jutland (An-
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1936),  
p. 372.
 74. Ibid., p. 517.
 75. Sims, “Comments on North Sea Fight,” p. 4.
 76. Ibid.
 77. Phillips Payson O’Brian, British and American 
Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900–1936 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 117–19.
 78. Orders to duty, formal appointment, and 
commission to rear admiral of 19 March 
1917, with the additional endorsement 
acknowledging formal receipt on 21 March, 
Sims Papers, box 142, LC.
 79. Josephus Daniels, Our Navy at War (Wash-
ington, DC: Pictorial Bureau, 1922), pp. 
36–39. Also see Naval Investigation: Hearings 
before the Senate Subcommittee on Naval Af-
fairs, 66th Cong. (1921).
 80. Lewis Bayly, Pull Together! The Memoirs of 
Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly—With Forewords by 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Admiral Sir Roger 
Backhouse (London: G. G. Harrap, 1939),  
p. 233.
 81. Capt. Joel R. P. Pringle, submitted to Sims, 
“Historical Sketch of Activities during the 
War,” 12 March 1919, Sims Papers, box 54, 
LC; William N. Still Jr., ed., The Queenstown 
Patrol, 1917: The Diary of Commander Joseph 
Knefler Taussig, U.S. Navy (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 1996), pp. 19–21.
 82. Tracy Barrett Kittredge, comp., “A Brief 
Summary of the United States Naval Activi-
ties in European Waters with Outline of the 
Organization of Admiral Sims’ Headquarters,” 
3 August 1918, pp. 1–17, Kittredge Papers, 
box 8, Navy History and Heritage Command, 
Washington, DC. Also see William S. Sims, 
The Victory at Sea (Garden City, NJ: Double-
day, Page, 1920), pp. 204–23; Tracy Barrett 
Kittredge, Naval Lessons of the Great War: A 
Review of the Senate Naval Investigation of 
the Criticisms by Admiral Sims of the Policies 
and Methods of Josephus Daniels (New York: 
Doubleday, Page, 1921), pp. 3–117, 255–79, 
407–50; John Langdon Leighton, SIMSADUS-
London: The American Navy in Europe (New 
York: Henry Holt, 1920), pp. 3–23, 59–62, 
150–58, 352–55; and Dudley W. Knox, comp., 
The American Naval Planning Section— 
London (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Dept., 
1923), pp. 1–10.
 83. Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, Sailors 
and Scholars, p. 121.
 84. Andrew Lambert, “Sir Julian Corbett, Naval 
History, and the Development of Sea Power 
Theory,” in Strategy and the Sea: Essays in 
Honour of John B. Hattendorf, ed. N. A. M. 
Rodger et al. (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell, 
2016), pp. 190–200; Paul M. Ramsey, “Profes-
sor Spenser Wilkinson, Admiral William 
Sims, and the Teaching of Strategy and Sea 
Power at the University of Oxford and the 
United States Naval War College, 1901–1927,” 
in Strategy and the Sea, ed. Rodger et al., pp. 
213–25. Also see Andrew Lambert, The Foun-
dations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, 
the Royal Navy, and the Historical Profession 
(London: Chatham, 1998), pp. 30, 121–22, 
231–32.
 85. Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, Sailors 
and Scholars, pp. 125–39; Michael Vlahos, 
The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and 
the American Mission, 1919–1941 (Newport, 
RI: Naval War College Press, 1980), pp. 
55–130.
 86. Cdr. Chester W. Nimitz, “Thesis on Tactics,” 
28 April 1923, p. 60, box 5, folder 21, record 
group 13, NWC, available at usnwcarchive 
.org/.
 87. Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh, Sailors 
and Scholars, p. 139.
6900_Kohnen.indd   145 9/20/16   1:54 PM
23
Kohnen et al.: The U.S. Navy Won the Battle of Jutland
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
David Kohnen earned a PhD with the Laughton 
Chair of Naval History at the University of London 
(King’s College London). As a maritime historian, he 
concentrates on naval strategy, operations, and or-
ganizational group dynamics. He edited the works of 
Commodore Dudley W. Knox in 21st Century Knox: 
Influence, Sea Power, and History for the Modern 
Era (Naval Institute Press, 2016). A previous book, 
Commanders Winn and Knowles: Winning the U-
boat War with Intelligence (Enigma Press, 1999), fo-
cused on the transatlantic alliance between the Brit-
ish Empire and the United States. A book in progress, 
Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy: Admiral Ernest 
J. King and His Headquarters during the Second 
World War, reconsiders the underlying influence of 
history on American concepts of “sea power.”
Nicholas Jellicoe’s grandfather, Sir John Jellicoe, 
commanded the Grand Fleet at Jutland; his father, 
George, was a minister of defence for the Royal Navy 
and the last man to hold the time-honored post of 
first lord of the Admiralty. Jellicoe is active in his-
torical research and contributed to the 2016 Battle of 
Jutland Centenary Initiative, which brought together 
internationally renowned historians as well as the 
immediate families of battle of Jutland veterans from 
both sides and provided educational programming 
about the First World War for the public. He is the 
author of Jutland: The Unfinished Battle; A Person-
al History of a Naval Controversy (Naval Institute 
Press, 2016). Jellicoe’s career was in communications, 
finishing with responsibility for Rolex’s worldwide 
communications.
The grandson of U.S. Navy admiral William S. Sims, 
Nathaniel Sims, MD, is a cardiac anesthesiologist at 
Massachusetts General Hospital, an assistant pro-
fessor at Harvard Medical School, and a researcher 
and medical device inventor. Dr. Sims holds numer-
ous U.S. patents and has received awards for his 
contributions to patient safety, including the 2016 
establishment of the Nathaniel M. Sims, MD, En-
dowed Chair in Anesthesia Innovation and Bioen-
gineering at Massachusetts General Hospital. Dr. 
Sims remains heavily involved with the Naval War 
College, where his grandfather twice served as Presi-
dent (February–April 1917 and April 1919–October 
1922).
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2016, Vol. 69, No. 4
6900_Kohnen.indd   122 9/20/16   1:54 PM
24
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 4, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/11
